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Abstract 
In Mozambique, easily treatable diseases such as malaria, diarrhea, and respiratory infections 
contribute to a heavy burden of disease. Notwithstanding efforts by the Mozambican government to 
promote access to health care, many who could benefit from simple cost-effective health care services 
do not currently receive treatment. Moreover, it is known that the utilization of health services varies 
considerably across spatial domains and socio-economic groups. This paper is concerned with 
understanding the determinants of utilization of curative health services, paying particular attention 
to the role of income. It provides a broad analytical framework for analyzing both the binary decision 
to seek formal health care in the event of illness, and the multinomial choice of health care provider. 
The results show that income is not an important determinant of health care choices in Mozambique. 
Rather, other factors, in particular education and physical access, are more important. Moreover, 
unlike in some studies, own (time) price elasticity does not vary notably with income. At a 
methodological level, the analysis shows that the general conclusions are robust to a number of 
estimation issues that are rarely addressed explicitly in the analysis of health care choices, including 
sample selection, the potential endogeneity of consumption, and cluster-level unobservables. For the 
analysis of provider choice, the paper demonstrates the merits of a ￿flexible￿ behavioral model. In 
particular, the paper rejects some of the restrictions of the standard model of provider choice, and 
shows that both the level of the price elasticity and the extent to which the elasticity varies with 
income is sensitive to the empirical specification. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In Mozambique, easily treatable diseases such as malaria, diarrhea, and respiratory infections 
contribute to a heavy burden of disease. This situation is commonplace in developing countries 
(WHO 2000; 2001; World Bank 1993). In part, the problem reflects a lack of access to and 
utilization of basic curative health services. Such services can only play a minor role in addressing 
the profound health challenges that developing countries face. Yet, they are often conceived as 
basic rights or entitlements, and both national governments and international organizations are at 
least formally committed to promoting broad access to basic health care (Culyer 1989; Culyer and 
Wagstaff 1993; Hurley 2000). Reflecting this commitment, the Mozambican government has 
expanded the rural health facility infrastructure in recent years, and promoted a policy of access 
based on need rather than income or ability to pay. However, notwithstanding these efforts, many 
who could benefit from simple cost-effective health care services do not currently receive 
treatment, and the utilization of health services varies considerably across spatial domains and 
socio-economic groups.  
This paper is concerned with understanding the determinants of utilization of curative health 
services, paying particular attention to the role of income. The relationship between income and 
utilization of health services has been the focus of a sizeable literature on the benefit-incidence of 
public spending (e.g. Baker and van der Gaag 1993; Castro Leal, et al. 2000; Demery 2000; 
Heltberg, et al. 2001; Makinen, et al. 2000; Sahn and Younger 2000; van de Walle 1995). Much 
of this work has highlighted the existence and severity of health related inequalities and inequities 
in many contexts. However, although simple correlation between income and health service 
utilization is of interest, it is important to recognize that the presence or absence of such 
correlation tells us little about the direct impact of income on utilization. Reflecting this concern, 
this paper seeks to goes beyond a simple descriptive analysis of the relationship between utilization 
and income, to understand the importance of specific variables as determinants of utilization.  
The analysis indicates that income is not an important determinant of health care choices in 
Mozambique, and that own price elasticity does not vary notably with income. These results, 
which are shown to be robust to a number of estimation issues that are rarely addressed explicitly 
in the analysis of health care choices, stand in contrast to findings in many other countries. They 
suggest that money cost does not comprise an important barrier to utilization in Mozambique, but 
that education and physical access comprise important factors. However, the paper also 
demonstrates the sensitivity of findings to empirical specification, and confirms the merits of a 
￿flexible￿ behavioral model. In particular, the paper rejects some of the restrictions of the standard 
model of provider choice, and shows that both the level of the price elasticity and the extent to 
which the elasticity varies with income is sensitive to the empirical specification. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a basic analytical framework for 
analyzing the binary choice of seeking care, drawing extensively on the existing literature on health 
care demand. The section also provides an overview of evidence on the incidence of illness and the 
decision to seek curative care in Mozambique, and presents findings from an empirical analysis of 
the decision to visit a formal health care provider. Section 3 extends the basic analytical 
framework to address the multinomial choice of health care provider for curative care. The 
empirical analysis covers both a basic multinomial model, and a fuller and more flexible model that 
includes alternative-specific prices. Here, the paper looks not only at the direct impact of income  
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on health care choices, but also asks whether the time price elasticity varies with income. Finally, 
section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  THE DECISION TO SEEK CARE FROM A FORMAL PROVIDER 
2.1  Modeling and estimation of the binary choice to seek care 
Recent economic analysis of health care choices have been rooted in the human capital and 
household production literature. In his seminal contribution, Becker (1965) shed light on the 
simultaneous process of home production and consumption, and the impact of market prices, time 
prices, incomes, and technologies on the production function for home goods. Using this 
framework, Grossman (1972a; 1972b) presented a model in which health does not affect market 
and non-market productivity, but rather the total amount of time that can be spent productively.
1 
In this model, it is health rather than health care that enters the utility function. Health care, along 
with time and other intermediate inputs, comprise arguments in a health production function, and 
the demand for curative medical care represents the rational response to a health shock, which 
leads individuals to shift some resources away from consumption towards medical care and other 
inputs that result in an improvement of health.  
In Grossman￿s model, the marginal productivity of health capital depends on the wage rate. 
If the wage rate is higher, health is more valuable. But health also requires complementary time 
input, the cost of which increases with the wage rate. Hence, although the model establishes clear 
mechanisms by which increases in income can lead to an increased demand for medical care￿both 
through the increased demand for health capital and through a substitution away from time inputs 
into the production of health towards health care and other inputs￿predictions are sensitive to the 
precise specification of the model. For example, the impact of the wage rate on the demand for 
medical care would depend critically on technology, in particular the time and money costs 
associated with accessing medical care. In contrast with the wage rate, wealth does not have an 
impact on either the marginal productivity of health capital or on the shadow price of time inputs. 
The impact of wealth on health care demand therefore represents a pure income effect. The 
importance of the income effect depends to a great extent on whether health capital is considered a 
compliment to wealth. 
A number of empirical studies in developed countries have been motivated by this 
framework, focusing on different dimensions of health care demand, including the number of visits 
in a given period (Acton 1975; Heller 1982), expenditure on health care (Grossman 1972a; b), 
demand for and choice of medical care under different insurance schemes (Manning, et al. 1987). 
These studies have tended to find positive but small effects of income on medical care use, 
although findings differ for different types of health services. In developing countries, data 
limitations have not permitted testing based on Grossman￿s dynamic framework. Instead, empirical 
analysis has been based on a simpler static framework (e.g. Gertler, et al. 1987; Gertler and van 
der Gaag 1990). In this framework, the choice between use and non-use of health services can be 
______________________ 
1 Grossman contrasted a pure consumption model, in which health capital enters directly in the utility function, and 
the investment model, where health capital determines the amount of time available for work. For a recent review, 
see Grossman (2000).  
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cast in a simple random utility model. Assuming a given health shock, the respective utility of 
receiving health services (s) and not receiving services (ns) can be represented as  
  ) ; , , ( s s s s
s x h U U φ ε =  and   ) ; , , ( ns ns ns ns
ns x h U U φ ε = , 
where,  h is health status, x is non-health consumption, ε is a random error term, and ϕ is a 
parameter vector. Health status (hs and hns), in turn, can be represented as a health production 
function, 
  ) ; ( s s h h β z =  and  ) ; ( ns ns h h β z = , 
where z is a vector of individual, household, community, and health care provider characteristics. 
The health care choice is represented by the indicator function 
] [ 1 ns s U U S > = , 
whereby an individual visits a provider if the utility of doing so is greater than if no visit is made. 
The essential feature of the model concerns the trade-off between health and non-health 
consumption. This trade-off arises so long as  xs<xns and hs>hns.  
In order to operationalize this general framework, we must be more specific about functional 
form. Following the early literature on health care demand in developing countries (e.g. Akin, et 
al. 1984; 1986; Mwabu 1986), the empirical specification is based on a linear utility and health 
production function, such that  
s s s s s
s x h U ε ϕ ϕ + + = 2 1  and   ns ns ns ns ns
ns x h U ε ϕ ϕ + + = 2 1 , where 
z β ’
z
s s h =  and  z β ’
z
ns ns h = .
2 
Finally, non-health consumption, x, is a function of exogenous income, y, and travel time, 
i.e.  
Time y x s s s 2 1 γ γ − =  and  Time y x ns ns ns 2 1 γ γ − = .
3 
Using the linear functions for h and x, and with an appropriate reparametrization, the indirect 
utility function can be written as 
] ’ [ s s
s V V ε + = w α  and  ] ’ [ ns ns
















On this basis, the probability of using the health service is  
______________________ 
2 Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) and Dow (1996a) have noted considerable weaknesses with this specification. In 
particular, it does not permit the price elasticity of demand to be a function of income. This issue is discussed 
further below. 
3 For simplicity, we only consider time costs here. However, the budget constraint could also include direct money 
cost and other indirect cost. In some models, distance enters directly as a ￿nuisance￿ variable, rather than through 
the budget constraint (Acton 1975; Akin, et al. 1986; Akin, et al. 1995; Lavy and Germain 1994; Lavy and Quigley 
1991).  
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] Pr[ ] ) Pr[( ] Pr[ ] 1 Pr[ ε V V S s ns ns s
ns s > = − > − = > = = αw w α α w ε ε , where 
)   and   ( s ns ε ε ε − = − = ns s α α α . 
Under the assumption that ε ∼ N(0,1),  
) ’ ( ] ’ Pr[ ] ’ Pr[ ] 1 Pr[ w α w α w α w Φ = < = > = = ε ε S , 
where Φ is the standard normal distribution. This is the Probit model. Under appropriate regularity 
conditions, the parameter vector α can be estimated consistently using Maximum Likelihood 
techniques. This approach will further permit us to perform a series of hypothesis tests concerning 
single and joint restrictions on the coefficients of interest.  
 
2.2  Data, variables, and estimation 
The empirical analysis is based on the 1996/97 Mozambique National Household Survey on 
Living Conditions (IAF).
4 The survey was designed and implemented by the National Statistics 
Institute in Mozambique during the period of February 1996 to April 1997. The sample was 
selected in three stages and was geographically stratified to ensure representativeness at both at 
provincial level and for urban and rural areas. For the purposes of the analysis in this paper, the 
full sample consists of 41,302 individuals in just over 8,000 households.
5 Parts of the analysis 
refers to the sub-sample (n=4,591) of individuals that report having been ill in the four weeks 
preceding the interview.  
Reporting of illness 
On the basis of self-reported information, approximately 11.2 percent of respondents report 
being ill in the four weeks preceding the survey (see Figure 1 below and Table A 1 in appendix).
6 
The incidence of reported illness higher in higher income groups, for women, and among the 
young and elderly.
7 There is also considerable variation across provinces in illness reporting. The 
survey only contains limited information on the nature and severity of the illness. Illness is more 
severe among the poorer, and individuals in the poorest quintile tend to be ill for longer, have a 
higher incidence of activity limitation, and be limited in their activities for a longer period. The 
higher incidence of self-reported illness among the rich is counterintuitive but not unusual in 
household surveys (see, e.g. Wolfe and Behrman (1984) and Makinen et al. (1999)).  
______________________ 
4 InquØrito Nacional aos Agregados Familiares Sobre as Condi￿ıes de Vida (IAF). Details concerning the survey 
can be found in Datt et al. (2000) and MPF et al. (1998). 
5 The survey covered 42,769 individuals in 8,250 households. 1,467 observations, or just over 3 percent of the 
sample, was dropped due to inconsistencies or missing values in relevant variables. A large proportion of the 
dropped observations was due to missing data for age variables and housing characteristics (e.g. water supply and 
sanitation). 
6 In what follows, all percentages are calculated using sampling weights. 
7 This may be because richer households have a lower tolerance-threshold for their definition of ￿ill￿ than do poorer 
households. Also, recall of illness episodes may be related to education and formal treatment episodes. Both of these 
factors would make illness reporting by wealthier households more likely for a given health status.  
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The most common specific ailments are malaria (24.6 percent) and diarrhoea (17.2 percent), 
but 34 percent of those reporting illness reported none of the listed symptom groups. The pattern 
of reported symptoms does not vary considerably across income groups, although there is a 
tendency for a higher proportion of the poorest to report ￿other￿ illness, which may be an 
indication of difficulties of self-diagnosing. While diarrhea is a big problem in infants (36.6 
percent), the elderly (46 years or older) primarily suffer from symptoms other than those 
categories included in questionnaire (48 percent). Symptoms also vary across urban and rural 
areas, with malaria being more commonly reported in urban areas and other (unspecified) 
symptoms being more common in rural areas. This may be due to differences in the capacity to 
self-diagnose, or to understand a diagnosis communicated by  a health professional. Similarly to 
illness reporting, there are notable provincial disparities in reported symptoms across provinces, in 
particularly in respect of malaria and diarrhea..  
 
The Decision to Seek Care 
Those who reported seeking care were asked to specify whether this consultation was with a 
(i) hospital; (ii) private clinic; (iii) health post; (iv) doctor; (v) nurse; (vi) pharmacy; (vii) traditional 
medical practitioner; or, (viii) other.
8 The probit analysis focuses on visits to a formal health care 
provider, conditional on illness. Using information on reported health care choices, an indicator 
variable was constructed for whether an individual had sought care at a formal provider, including 
a hospital, health center, or health post. In the sample, 5.8 percent of individuals report having 
visited a formal provider in the four weeks preceding the survey. Conversely, 51.9 percent of the 
sub-sample of individuals who report illness made a visit to a formal providers (see Table 1). As 
can be seen from Figure 1 below, utilization of formal health care providers varies considerably 
depending on province, urban/rural domain, and income, with hospital care being more important 
in the southern provinces, in urban areas, and among the rich (see also Table A 2 in appendix). 
Table 1 ￿ Dependent variable: visit to formal provider 
  Mean 
  Full sample  Sub-sample of sick 
Health care visit a 5.8  51.9 




8 The questionnaire only permitted one care-seeking episode. If several consultations were made in the last month, 
answers prefer to the last consultation. The survey hence ignores many of the complexities that characterize health 
seeking behavior. For example, Beattie and Kraushaar (1999) report evidence from Mozambique that many people 
consult TMPs as a complement to formal health services. See also discussion of use of TMPs in Cabral (1999).  
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The utilization of health services is likely to depend on demand factors such as income, cost 
of and access to care, education, social norms and traditions, and the quality and appropriateness 
of the services provided, etc. (see Table A 3 and Table A 4 for descriptive statistics on individuals 
and households). The analysis focuses on three sets of explanatory variables: individual, 
household, and community (a complete description of the variables in the analysis is presented 
Table A 5 in the Appendix).  
Among the individual level variables, we pay particular attention to the role of income, 
proxied by per capita household consumption. Household consumption was measured through 
detailed questionnaire modules on food and non-food consumption and expenditures. Non-food 
consumption includes both direct consumption and imputed use-value from household housing and 
assets.
9 Household-level consumption estimates have been deflated using spatial price indices, 
defined for 13 regional domains in the original data analysis. These spatial domains were used to 
reflect spatial differences in prices and in consumption and expenditure patterns. The distinction 
between poor and non-poor individuals is based on poverty lines constructed for the respective 
spatial domains on the basis of the minimum cost of meeting the defined minimum standard of 
food and non-food consumption. Consumption varies from 1,720 Meticais for the poorest quintile, 
______________________ 
9 See Datt et al. (2000) for details.   
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to 12,308 Meticais for the richest quintile. The analysis also controls for other factors related to 
economic activity, in particular whether the individual or someone in the household is reports 
having an occupation and is currently working. 
Beyond the economic characteristics of the household and individuals, there are a range of 
other individual- and household-level factors that are important as determinants of health seeking 
behavior. We control for age, education, gender, and severity and nature of illness. In order to 
permit non-linear effects, both education and age enter as a series of dummy variables. Education 
refers to the own education (highest grade attained) for individuals over 16 years, while younger 
individuals are assigned the highest grade attained by any household member. The severity and 
nature of illness is controlled for through the inclusion of both symptom dummies and a dummy 
variable for whether the individual reported activity limitations.
10 At household level, wealth is 
proxied by the number of rooms of the dwelling, and an indicator variable for ownership of a 
radio. Other characteristics of the dwelling, such as presence of latrine or water closet and water 
source, were not considered on the grounds that these variables not only proxy for wealth, but 
also are determinants of health status and illness incidence.
11  
In respect of community characteristics, we primarily control for physical access to health 
care, both through travel time, road quality and access to transport, a dummy variable for whether 
there is a health center or post in the community, and a dummy variable for whether there is a 
hospital located in the district. The travel time to the closest formal provider was based on 
information collected thought a community key informant. In urban areas, where community 
informants were not interviewed, it was assumed to by 20 minutes.
12 As facility data were not 
collected as part of the household survey, it is not possible to control directly for quality.
13 In the 
preliminary analysis, we used a district-level proxy for quality based on public expenditure on 
health care. This proxy did not have a significant impact on health seeking behavior, and is not 
used in the analysis. 
Analysis 
The empirical analysis of binary health care choice addresses five issues. First, three basic 
probit models were estimated over the sub-sample of individuals who report an incidence of illness 
in the four weeks preceding the interview, where each model differs in respect of the specification 
of consumption. Second, separate models were estimated for different sub-populations and spatial 
domains (poor/non-poor and urban/rural) to test whether the coefficient estimates of interest are 
the same across the respective sub-populations. Third, we address possible selection issues arising 
______________________ 
10 Most studies of health care demand include a measure of health status as an explanatory variable. Akin et al. 
(1995) include symptoms and seriousness of illness; Gertler et al. (1987) and Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) 
include number of days healthy in last four weeks in the health production function; Lavy and Quigley (1991) use 
number of days individuals report being unable to perform tasks. As many of these studies note, these variables are 
problematic in that they may be endogenous to the health care choice. In order to limit this problem, we use simple 
dummy variables.  
11 These health related household assets are however used in the estimation of illness reporting (see below). 
12 This assumption was validated looking at reported travel time by urban respondents who actually visited a 
provider. Although there was some variation in reported travel time, 20 minutes is close to the mean and a 
reasonable approximation for most individuals in the sample. 
13 There are many studies demonstrating the importance of different dimensions of quality in health seeking 
behavior (see e.g. Akin, et al. 1998; Hutchinson 1999; Litvack and Bodart 1993).   
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from the use of the sub-sample of ill individuals through an explicit estimation of the selection 
process. Fourth, we test for endogeneity of consumption variables. Finally, we look at whether 
taking into account community-level fixed effects alters the findings. 
 
2.3  Results 
Binary health care choice: visit to a formal provider conditional on illness 
Table A 8 reports results from three different specifications are reported. In specification 
(A), consumption enters as a continuous variable; in (B) both consumption and consumption 
squared are included; and in (C) quintile dummies are included to permit a more non-linear impact 
of consumption. As a general conclusion, consumption is not consistently significant as a 
determinant of health service utilization. In (A), consumption is significant, but when a squared 
term is also included in (B), neither consumption or the squared term is significant. Of the quintile 
dummies, only the fourth quintile has a significant effect, and they are not jointly significant.  
Looking at the relative impact of different variables in a probit model is complicated by the 
fact that the model is non-linear in the explanatory variables, and, as a consequence, the impact of 
independent variables on the probability of seeking a particular type of care depend on the value of 
that and other independent variables. However, we can assess the importance of different 
explanatory variables by looking at marginal changes in predicted probabilities for a 
￿representative individual￿. In this case, we control for variation in all independent variables 
except the one of interest. The predicted probability under scenario m is  
) ~ ’ ￿ ( ] ~ ’ ￿ r[ P
~
] ~ 1 [ r P
~ m m m
i S w α w α w Φ = < = = ε , 
where  α ￿  is the vector of estimated coefficients, and w ~  is the vector of explanatory variables, 
where all variables are at the population mean except the variable of interest. The predicted 
probability under scenario m can be compared with an alternative scenario, m￿, where the value of 
the variable under consideration is changed while the rest remain constant. This approach provides 
a useful perspective on how predicted probabilities depend on specific variables of interest.
14  
As can be seen from Figure 2, the effect of consumption on predicted probability of a health 
care visit in the event of illness is small. This can be contrasted with the effects of education, 
accessibility, severity, and other significant variables, which are considerably more important 
(Table 2). Although the impact of consumption is limited, some other variables related to 
consumption, in particular whether someone in the household is professionally active has a 
significant effect. Also, regardless of the specification, age has a significant effect, such that 
children, in particular infants, are considerably more likely to seek care. This is consistent with the 
descriptive statistics presented above. 
 
______________________ 
14 However, it is important to remember that because of the non-linearities in the mapping between independent 
variables into probability space, predicted probabilities at averages are not in general equal to average predicted 
probabilities.  
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Poorest quintile Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest quintile
Model A Model B Model C
Table 2 ￿ Predicted probabilities (2) 
 
  Predicted 
probability  95% CI 
Education    
No education  0.48  (0.42,0.54) 
Less than primary 1  0.56  (0.52,0.60) 
Primary 1  0.68  (0.62,0.74) 
Primary 2 or more  0.68  (0.58,0.77) 
Community level literacy   
29% of district literate (lowest)  0.49  (0.43,0.56) 
89% of district literate (highest)  0.68  (0.58,0.77) 
Physical accessibility of health care 
15 min. travel and access  0.68  (0.64,0.72) 
120 min. travel and good access  0.50  (0.45,0.55) 
120 min. travel and poor access  0.42  (0.35,0.49) 
Illness severity (activity limitation) 
No activity limitation  0.52  (0.48,0.57) 
Activity limitation  0.59  (0.55,0.62) 
Note: Predicted probabilities at population means for all variables 
except the one indicated   
 
In order to shed further light on the importance of income on care-seeking behavior, we also 
test whether parameter estimates are significantly different for poor and non-poor individuals, and 
for individuals in urban and rural areas (results for relevant sub-populations are presented in Table 
A 9). The hypothesis that all the coefficients are the same for the poor and the non-poor is rejected 
by the data.
15 However, separate Chow tests indicate that the coefficients on consumption, 
education, and age, are not significantly different for the poor and non-poor, while the coefficients 
on travel time are significantly smaller (in absolute terms) for the poor than non-poor. Similar 
conclusions hold in respect of the difference in coefficient estimates for individuals in urban and 
rural areas. 
Selection bias 
As in most surveys, information relating to health care decisions is only reported conditional 
on previous reporting of illness in the IAF. However, the process that determines health status and 
illness reporting (for a given health status) is unlikely to be exogenous to health care choices. In 
particular, there may be unobservables that determine both reporting of illness and utilization of 
health services, leading to possible selection bias.
16 Put differently, the probability that an 
individual who reports illness will seek care (for some given health status) may be different from 
the probability of individuals who do not report illness (if they had the same health status). If this 
is the case, results from the analysis of the sub-sample of individuals who report illness do not 
accurately reflect the relationship for the population as whole.  
______________________ 
15 This is the case regardless of whether poverty is defined using the official poverty line, or if those below median 
income are considered poor.  
16 Correlation between error terms in selection and health care choice can be due to a range of factors, e.g. the 
presence of unobservables such as perception of illness or health endowment.   
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Some contributors have sought to address this issue, but the evidence is mixed. Dor and van 
der Gaag (1993) use a two-step approach and find no selection bias in health care demand 
estimated conditional on being ill. Using a different methodology, Dow (1996b) finds that in data 
from C￿te d￿Ivoire, health demand estimates conditioned on health status do not suffer from 
statistical selection bias. Akin et al. (1998), on the other hand, estimate an illness equation jointly 
with the choice of care equation and find that failure to control for sample selectivity of the 
reported illness does reduce the estimated price coefficient in the demand equation.  
Here, we address the selection issue by estimating a nested bi-probit (Table A 10 reports 
results on illness reporting and the selection-corrected probit on health care visit to a formal 
provider). A number of the variables that are included in the care visit probit are also significant 
determinants of illness reporting, including gender, age, and the number of household members. In 
addition, some of the excluded variables, in particular water source in the home, low per capita 
spending on health in the district (proxy for quality), and the month of the interview, are 
significant. However, the broad conclusions from the simple conditional probit still stand, 
suggesting that selection bias is not important. Moreover, the Wald test cannot reject the 
hypothesis of zero correlation between the error terms in the selection equation and the main 
probit equation. 
Endogeneity of consumption  
We further test for the possibility that consumption is endogenous in the model, which 
would result in biased estimates. In an instrumental variable probit, we instrument for consumption 
with household asset variables and dummy variables for the month of the interview. The 
coefficients of the IV probit are very similar to the standard probit. Moreover, on the basis of the 
Smith-Blundell test for exogeneity (Smith and Blundell 1986), the hypothesis that consumption is 
exogenous cannot be rejected (p-value 0.766).  
Unobserved community heterogeneity 
So far, we have assumed that cluster effects are exogenous, and simply corrected for the 
clustered structure of the data by presenting robust estimates of standard errors (i.e. taking into 
account within-cluster correlation of error terms).
17 However, if exogeneity does not hold, 
community level unobservables are not independent of the regressors, and a fixed effects model is 
appropriate. This would be the case, for example, if unobservable characteristics of the community 
such as health care quality were correlated with observable characteristics such as income level.  
Table A 11 presents results from both random and fixed effect logits, and contrasts the 
results with a standard logit. The estimates are similar across the respective models. Assuming the 
random effects model is correctly specified and efficient, the Hausman test rejects the hypothesis 
that the coefficients of the fixed effects model are systematically different from the random effects 
model (Prob>chi2 = 0.164). This offers some support of the assumption that cluster effects are 
exogenous. Although the random effects estimator can achieve greater efficiency than a standard 
logit or probit, its properties are not well understood, in particular for small sample.  
______________________ 
17 If cluster-level (village) heterogeneity is exogenous, the standard probit or logit model is consistent, although the 
random effects model is more efficient.  
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3.  PROVIDER CHOICE 
3.1  Extending the model to analyze provider choice 
The framework for modeling and estimating a binary choice of seeking health care can easily 
be extended to consider the choice between alternative providers. When sick, an individual faces J 
health care options.
18 In the simplest case, the choice between alternatives depends only on 
individual, household, and community characteristics, z. In this case, the utility of option j, 
conditional on illness is  
) ; , , ( j j j j x h U U φ ε = , where 
) ; ( j j h h β z = . 
As before, z is a vector of individual, household, and community characteristics, and x is 
non-health consumption. The choice of provider can be represented by the indicator function, 
)] ,... , ( [ 1 1 1 J j j U U U Max U S = = . 
Similarly to the dichotomous case, we need to be more specific about functional form in 
order to operationalize this general framework. With a linear model (see e.g. Akin, et al. 1984; 
1986; Mwabu 1986),  
j j j j j x h U ε ϕ ϕ + + = 2 1 , where 
z β ’ j j h = . 
With reparamterization, the indirect utility function can be written as 
j j j j x V ε α + + = 2 1 ’z α =  w α ’ j . 
Note that there are no differences in the explanatory variables across alternatives. In other 
words, differences in Vj are entirely due to differences in alternative specific parameters. This is the 
Multinomial Logit Model (MNLM), based on McFadden (1973). Under appropriate conditions, 
the MNLM can be derived from the latent variable model by specifying the distribution of error 
terms as iid with type I extreme value distribution (McFadden 1981), such that  











+ + + +
= = .
19 
In many cases, it may be desirable to move beyond the simple model to include provider 
attributes, in particular alternative-specific costs. This permits an analysis of the price-
responsiveness of health care demand. In principle, this can easily be done by taking into account 
______________________ 
18 The set of choices would typically include home/self-care as well as different types of health care providers. 
19 In order to achieve identification, one of the coefficient vectors is set to zero.  
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cost of health care in the budget constraint. In other words, rather than treating consumption as 
exogenous, non-health consumption is the difference between exogenous income, y, and the unit 
cost of care from provider j, pj. In this case, 
j j j j p y x 2 1 γ γ − = , which gives 
j j j j j j p y V ε α α + + + = 2 1 ’z α
z . 
However, as pointed out by Gertler et al. (1987), and Gertler and van der Gaag (1990), this 
specification assumes that responsiveness to prices is independent of income.
20 To address this 
perceived weakness, they proposed an empirical specification based on a semi-quadratic utility 
function which is linear in health but quadratic in consumption, where 
j j j j j j j j x x h U ε ϕ ϕ ϕ + + + =
2
3 2 1 , which gives 




3 2 1 ’z α
z  
There has been some debate in the literature about what constraints should be imposed on 
the parameters of the above model. Gertler et al. (1987), constrain all income and price related 
coefficients to be equal across the different alternatives, such that 
J k m mk mj ∈ ∀ = = ; 5 ,.., 1 α α , and 
4 5 2α α − = . 
Moreover, because y and y
2 do not vary across alternatives, these variables then drop out of 
the estimated equation (i.e.  0 1 = α  and  0 3 = α ). Although this specification includes a price-income 
interaction term, thus permitting the price responsiveness of demand to be a function of income, 
Dow (1996a) raises a number of concerns in respect of the implicit restrictions that the model 
embodies. As an alternative, he proposes a ￿flexible behavioral model￿, which has been favored in 
some recent studies of health care demand (see e.g. Akin, et al. 1998). First, in this flexible 
specification, coefficients on price and price/income variables are allowed to vary across 
alternatives. This is motivated by a relaxation of the assumption of additive separability in the 
utility function.
21 Second, Dow also seeks to add flexibility to the basic model through the 
parameterization of the budget constraint, whereby uncertainty about the appropriate budget 
period results in a relaxation of the restriction on the relationship between α4 and α5.
22 Finally, 
______________________ 
20 To see this, it suffices to note that the difference in utility between two choices does not depend on income, and 
hence income does not directly affect choice. 
21 The assumption can be relaxed in a number of ways. Dow proposes the inclusion of an interaction term between 
consumption and health improvements in the utility function; rich and poor may place different values on 
improvement in health status.  
22 The idea is based on Gertler et al. (1987). They note that the appropriate measure of income depends on the 
functioning of credit markets. If capital markets are perfect, the relevant income constraint is the present value of 
income. At the other extreme, the income constraint is the current income. They propose a specification which 
permits this issue being resolved by the data. Income was measured as total family income in the month prior to the 
survey. Gertler et al. find that the hypothesis that budgeting is restricted to one period is accepted and hence data on 
current income is applicable. On this basis, Dow (1996b) specifies residual consumption as xj,t=λy-pj, where λ is an  
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Dow (1996b) argues for the inclusion of cross-prices in the utility from choice j, providing 
theoretical justification for this by assuming forward-looking behaviour. The estimated equation 
hence becomes  




3 2 1 ’ p α z α
z , where 
]’ ,..., [ 1 J p p = p . 
  
3.2  Variables, and estimation 
In the analysis of provider choice, the dependent variable is a polychotomous variable 
reflecting the five health care alternatives captured by the survey (Table 3).  
Table 3 ￿ Dependent variable: provider choice 
  Mean 
  Full sample  Sub-sample of sick 
Home/self care  93.2  39.6 
Traditional practitioner  0.9  8.4 
Hospital 2.1  19.2 
Health post or center  3.4  30.2 
Other 0.3  2.5 
 
As can be seen from table Figure 3 below, there is considerable variation in provider choice 
across provinces, urban-rural domain, and to some extent, socioeconomic group (see also Table A 
2 in appendix) For example, in urban areas, 43.4 percent of those seeking care report attending 
hospitals, while the corresponding percentage for rural areas is 13.6 percent. Mirroring this 
difference, individuals in rural areas are more likely to attend health posts (31.1 percent, compared 
to 26.3 percent in urban areas) and traditional practitioners (10.0 percent, compared to 1.7 percent 
in urban areas).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
unknown parameter representing the budgeting period for the income y from which the health care price pj is 
subtracted.  
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For a first look at provider choice, we estimate a MNLM using the same set community, 
household, and individual level explanatory variables. We continue to control for proximity to a 
primary health facility, and the availability of a hospital in the district, but no alternative-specific 
variables￿e.g. price or travel time to each type of provider￿are included. As above, the analysis 
focuses on the role of consumption, with the impact of consumption explored for three different 
specifications.  
Second, we estimate a ￿flexible￿ specification with alternative-specific prices. As in many 
other surveys, we do not have observed data on prices from all providers for each individual in the 
sample, but only on actual payments made by users of particular services (see Table A 6). On this 
basis, some studies have estimated hedonic price equations for specific providers and imputed 
prices for all individuals (see e.g. Gertler, et al. 1987; Gertler and van der Gaag 1990; Lavy and 
Quigley 1991). However, most contributors opt to use official fees as proxies for prices. Of 
course, user fees often vary by form of treatment, and in most surveys the form of treatment 
actually received is not observed. This is the case in the Mozambique survey, where the data do 
not reveal what services or medicines were received in exchange for any payment. Akin et al. 
(1995) suggest that official outpatient registration fee be used as best proxy for ranking of overall 
facility price. However, user fees in Mozambique are very limited, and do not vary significantly 
across providers or provider types. Currently, the fee for outpatient consultations in both 
hospitals, health center, and health posts is 1,000 MT in urban areas and 500 MT in rural areas￿
the same level as in 1996 despite substantial increases in the general price index. In the absence of 
price variation, a money price effect cannot be identified. This has led many analysts to focus on 
time prices to identify a price effect. This procedure is followed here.
23  
The time price was constructed as the product of opportunity cost of time and the travel 
time associated with the respective alternative.
24 Travel time of home care is assumed to be zero. 
For traditional practitioner, data from community key informant were used. Where data were 
missing, values were constructed by averaging reported actual travel time for individuals in the 
______________________ 
23 Although there is some theoretical foundation for simply considering time price as a part of the overall cost of 
care (Becker 1965), the little evidence that is available suggests that the effect of time and money prices can be very 
different (Mwabu 1989). 
24 In principle, the time spent seeking care includes both travel time and time spent waiting to receive care. Due to 
data limitations, only travel time is used as an explanatory variable.  
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community who had visited a traditional practitioner in the four weeks preceding the interview.
25 
The opportunity cost of time is proxied by per capita household consumption. This is in contrast 
with some of the literature which has used community-level wage rates as reported by a key 
informant (e.g. Gertler, et al. 1987; Gertler and van der Gaag 1990). These data were not 
consistently available in the Mozambique data. Moreover, although household consumption has 
the disadvantage of being endogenous to health, it captures within-community differences in the 
opportunity cost of time.  
Following the empirical specification set out above, consumption, consumption squared, 
price and cross-prices, own price squared, an own price-income interaction term are included as 
explanatory variables. This specification permits us to assess whether consumption has an impact 
on provider choice, as well as the extent to which demand responsiveness to prices varies 
depending on income. Moreover, the flexible specification permits us to test some of the 
assumptions that underpin the more restricted modeling framework set out above. 
The results of the MNLM is potentially sensitive to the assumption of independence from 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA). By construction, the relative probability of choosing two alternatives 
is unaffected by the presence of additional alternatives. This restriction can be relaxed by using 
more flexible models, in particular the nested MNLM or the Multinomial Probit Model (MNPM). 
However, these models suffer from their own weaknesses. The nested MNLM requires the 
modeler to specify the nesting structure. This is inherently ad hoc, and there are no ways of testing 
alternative nesting structures against each other. Conversely, the flexibility of the MNP is acquired 
at the cost of computational ease, essentially restricting the number of alternatives that can be 
considered. The literature offers limited guidance on the choice of modeling framework. Although 
there is some evidence that results can differ depending on the modeling framework (Akin, et al. 
1995; Bolduc, et al. 1996; Dor, et al. 1987; Mwabu, et al. 1993), it is not conclusive. Moreover, 
McFadden (1984, p. 1414) points out that ￿empirical experience is that the MNLM is relatively 
robust, as measured by goodness of fit or prediction accuracy, in many cases where the IIA 
property is theoretically implausible.￿ Here, we have more than four alternatives, and we want to 
avoid imposing an ad hoc nesting structure. For these reasons, the models are estimated using 
standard MNLM technique, although the IIA assumption is tested. 
 
3.3  Results 
A simple multinomial logit model 
Similarly to the binary model, we estimate three different specifications, where income enters 
either as a continuous variable (on its own or including squared consumption), or as income 
quintiles. Full results for the basic model and Wald tests for coefficient significance for models (B) 
and (C) are presented in Table A 12.
26 The results broadly mirror the binary case; consumption is 
significant in the basic model (A), but not significant when a consumption squared term is 
included, or when consumption enters as quintile dummies. Moreover, for the polychotomous 
______________________ 
25 If there were fewer than three individuals in the lowest sampling unity who had visited a traditional practitioner, 
the average for the larger geographical unit (administrative post) was used. A similar procedure was used to 
construct a travel time variable for hospitals, health centers/posts, and other providers. 
26 Full results for the alternative specifications are not available, but are available upon request.  
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provider choice variable, the consumption is only significant for some alternatives (hospital and 
health post). Besides not being consistently significant, the effect of consumption on predicted 
probabilities is small, regardless of the specification (see Figure 4;  Table A 14 in appendix present 
predicted probabilities with confidence intervals). As income increases, the estimates suggest that, 
controlling for other factors, individuals shift away from home/no care to seeking care at a hospital 
or health posts. 
 
Figure 4 ￿ Predicted probabilities: The effect of income 
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The results suggest that other variables than consumption are more important in the choice 
of health care provider. In particular, as expected, higher levels of education are associated with 
higher probabilities of seeking care in a hospital or health center, with a rapid fall in the probability 
of home care. The probability of home care also increases with travel time (see Figure 5 and Table 
A 15 in appendix). As before, age, severity, and urban residence have a significant impact on 
health care choices, at least for some of the alternatives.  
Figure 5 ￿ Predicted probabilities: The effect of education and physical access 
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We test the validity of the IIA assumption. As noted above, the IIA assumption implies that 
the odds for any pair of outcomes are determined without reference to the other outcomes that 
may be available. In this case, the Hausman test cannot reject the IIA assumption.
27 
 
Alternative-specific variables and demand elasticities 
We now introduce alternative-specific ￿prices￿ and estimate a more flexible model. This 
permits us to assess whether price elasticity is a function of income, while also testing some of the 
assumptions that underpin the theoretical model. 
The concern with price elasticity is related to the extensive and ongoing debate about the 
merits and implications of user fees for health services, and has been one of the main motivations 
for the substantial literature on health care demand.
28 The use fee debate was sparked off by early 
studies which found that neither fees nor income have a large impact on care-seeking behavior of 
households, and claimed that equity is better served by improving quality and expanding services 
(e.g. Akin, et al. 1986; Heller 1982). However, subsequent studies have found higher estimates of 
elasticity (e.g. Gertler and van der Gaag 1990; Haddad and Fournier 1995; Lavy and Quigley 
1991; Sauerbon, et al. 1994), and have also found considerable differences in price sensitivity 
across age groups, gender, and income categories. Although most of these studies suffer from a 
lack of exogenous price variation (Gertler and Hammer 1997), they have played an important role 
in shaping the debate about user fees.  
Results from the ￿flexible￿ specification are reported in Table A 13. The hypothesis that 
cross price effects all equal zero is rejected, as is the hypothesis that own-price coefficients are the 
same across alternatives.
29 The results hence suggest that the flexible model is appropriate. Neither 
consumption nor consumption squared are significant. Looking at the coefficients on prices 
variables, we find that the own-price effect is significant only for the health post alternative. In 
some cases, the cross-price coefficients are also significant, in particular the price for the health 
post alternative. The coefficients on own price squared are significant for hospital and health post, 
while the consumption-price interaction is not significant for any of the alternatives.  
Given the different channels through which price now affects health seeking behaviour, the 
coefficients on the respective variables are difficult to interpret. In order to assess the impact of 
prices on utilization of health services, we can, as before, look at predicted probabilities. However, 
for prices, it is more natural to look at the effect in terms of price elasticities of demand. Following 
______________________ 
27 The Hausman test is based on the idea that a consistent but inefficient estimator can be obtained by estimating the 
model on a restricted set of outcomes. The statistic measures the difference between the coefficients in a restricted 
model (with some outcomes eliminated), and those of the original model. 
28 The main argument for introducing user fees has been the need to relax financial constraints in contexts of fiscal 
stress, but some contributors have also pointed at potential efficiency, equity, and quality gains (de Ferranti 1985; 
Griffin 1992; Jimenez 1989; Shaw and Ainsworth 1994; World Bank 1987).There is now a considerable literature 
on user fee policies and their impact. For reviews, see, e.g., Creese (1991), Creese and Kutzin (1997) Gilson 
(1997), Jiminez (1995), McPake et al. (1993), Newbrander et al. (1997), Reddy and Vandemoortele (1996). 
29 However, the restriction that the coefficient on own price squared equal two times the coefficient on the price-
consumption interaction term (negative), which is implied by the restriction of coefficient equality across 
alternatives, is rejected.  
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Train (1986), the elasticity, Ej, of the choice probability Pr(choice=j) with respect to the a change 
in the price, pj, is defined as 
 










































Analogous to the case of continuous demand, the elasticity represents the percentage change 
in the probability of having a consultation with provider j due to a percentage change in price of 
consultation with provider j. Own price elasticities were calculated for the hospital and health post 
alternatives.  
The elasticities reported in Table 4 are relatively low compared to those reported in other 
studies.
30 However, comparisons should be made with caution, given that these estimates are 
based on time prices which have been calculated. There are however a couple of points that are 
noteworthy. First, and most importantly, there are notable differences in estimates of own price 
elasticity depending on the model specification, with higher elasticity in the more flexible models. 
This suggests that findings relating to income elasticity of health care demand can be very sensitive 
to the choice of specification. Second, as expected, there is essentially no difference in the own-
price elasticities across quintiles when own price is the only price related variable in the model 
(A).
31 However, even with a more flexible specification, which is better able to capture income-
dependent price effects, the own price elasticity does not vary substantially across income 
quintiles. Finally, for the health post alternative, the elasticity is higher for households with lower 
incomes, indicating that an increase in price will reduce realized access to basic care more for 
poorer household. Conversely, the own price elasticity of demand for hospital care increases with 
income. This suggests that the demand response to price increases would be strongest among 
richer households. 
Table 4 ￿ Time price elasticities by quintile 
  Model A    Model B    Model C    Model D 
  Post Hospital    Post Hospital    Post Hospital    Post Hospital 
Poorest  -0.03  -0.06  -0.08  -0.14  -0.12  -0.11  -0.15  -0.21 
Q2  -0.03  -0.06  -0.08  -0.13  -0.11  -0.11  -0.15  -0.21 
Q3  -0.03  -0.06  -0.08  -0.13  -0.11  -0.12  -0.15  -0.22 
Q4  -0.03  -0.05  -0.07  -0.13  -0.10  -0.13  -0.14  -0.23 
Richest  -0.03  -0.05  -0.06  -0.11  -0.09  -0.15  -0.13  -0.25 
Model A: Own price only; price coefficients constrained to be same across alternatives 
Model B: Own price, own price squared, price-consumption interaction; coefficients constrained to be same across 
alternatives 
Model C: Own price, own price squared, price-consumption interaction; coefficients unconstrained 




30 See Gertler and Hammer (1997) and Jack (1999) for a review of findings. 















 is the same across quintiles, but  ) Pr( 1 ( j choice = −  may vary.  
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has investigated the determinants of utilization of health services in Mozambique, 
paying particular attention to the role of income. It provides robust evidence on both the binary 
decision to seek care in the event of illness and on the multinomial choice of health care provider.  
The findings show that income is not an important determinant of health care choices in 
Mozambique. In the binary choice model, income, proxied by consumption, is not consistently 
significant as a determinant of utilization of curative health services. Moreover, although the 
estimated impact of income is sensitive to the specification of the empirical model, the impact is 
consistently small. The results from the analysis of provider choice largely mirror those of the 
binary choice model. Again, income is not a significant determinant, except in some specifications. 
When significant, the impact of income on predicted probabilities is small. Aside from the direct 
impact of income on health care choices, some studies have suggested that the price elasticity of 
demand may vary considerably across income groups. The results presented above suggest that in 
Mozambique the own (time) price elasticity is similar across income quintiles. Overall, the results 
suggest that income is not an important barrier to utilization in Mozambique. Rather, other 
factors, in particular education and physical access, are the more important. This suggests that the 
government has been successful in removing money cost as a barrier to utilization, but that efforts 
to promote utilization through improved physical access and information must be sustained.  
The paper also make a couple of methodological points. First, in the case of the binary 
choice model, the analysis suggests that results are robust to a number of estimation issues that are 
rarely addressed explicitly in the analysis of health care choices, including sample selection, the 
potential endogeneity of consumption, and cluster-level unobservables. Second, the analysis 
demonstrates the merits of the ￿flexible￿ behavioral model in the analysis of provider choice. Not 
only are some of the restrictions of a more basic model rejected in the analysis, but both the level 
of the price elasticity and the extent to which the elasticity varies with income is shown to be 
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APPENDIX A ￿ TABLES 
Table A 1 ￿ Illness reporting 















Poorest  quintile 8.9 12.3  65.4 6.1 23.0  15.8 7.0  7.9  1.0  7.3 38.2 
Q2  10.2 10.2 69.0  5.8  22.5 19.2  7.4  7.9  1.7  8.5  32.9 
Q3  10.4 11.2 64.9  6.0  24.2 15.5  8.6  9.1  2.2  6.2  34.2 
Q4  12.7 10.2 64.3  5.9  23.4 21.9  6.6  6.2  1.1  7.9  32.9 
Richest  quintile 13.9  10.5  61.0 5.4 28.9  13.8 8.0 10.5 1.2  4.7 33.1 
             
Male  10.0 10.7 64.9  5.9  25.0 17.7  7.4  7.8  1.5  8.0  32.6 
Female  12.4 10.8 64.4  5.8  24.4 16.9  7.6  8.8  1.3  5.8  35.1 
             
<  1  year  old  20.2  10.3  73.6 5.0 19.1  36.6 7.1 10.7 3.7  7.3 15.4 
1-4  16.1 9.0 65.7 5.1 22.9  29.4 6.3 11.5 3.2  8.7 18.1 
5-15  5.9  9.9 66.3 5.3 28.9  15.4 8.4 10.1 1.6  8.4 27.1 
16-45  10.9 11.2 64.7  6.4  26.1 14.4  6.5  7.4  0.7  5.0  39.9 
46-60  17.1  13.3  59.6  6.3  24.2  7.4 8.0 5.5 0.4 6.7  47.8 
>  60  21.9  12.5  58.8 5.1 17.5 8.0 12.9 5.1  0.2  6.9 49.2 
             
Rural    11.4 10.6 63.5  5.6  22.0 17.5  7.9  7.8  1.5  7.4  35.8 
Urban  10.3  11.1  69.2 6.5 35.9  16.0 5.6 10.9 1.2  4.0 26.3 
             
Niassa  25.4 10.2 77.1  6.8  27.5 20.9  2.7  7.3  0.7  5.8  35.2 
Cabo  Delgado  17.0 12.4 53.2  5.9  20.9 13.5 10.5  9.2  3.8  9.1  33.1 
Nampula  10.6 10.3 55.2  4.5  16.2 20.5 10.6 10.4  1.4  11.5 29.4 
Zambezia  9.9 10.7  66.3 5.0 19.7  29.4 3.4  8.5  0.7  3.5 34.9 
Tete  9.6  11.3 94.4 10.8 22.6 19.5 14.6  9.8  1.6  8.2  23.7 
Manica  15.6 9.7 63.6 5.8 28.7 9.5 9.5  2.2  1.6  3.1 45.5 
Sofala  10.3  13.2  52.0  5.9  23.8  6.7 6.2 6.3 2.1 7.8  47.1 
Inhambane  5.5 11.8  70.6 5.6 37.3 1.0 14.6 3.7  0.2  5.7 37.5 
Gaza  7.1 10.4  68.4 6.4 38.6 9.9  5.3 10.1 0.5  6.4 29.3 
Maputo  16.9 9.1 67.5 4.9 36.1  14.0 4.4 11.9 0.6  5.1 27.8 
Maputo  City  3.7  9.7 74.4 6.5 52.9 3.7  4.2 11.7 1.0  1.2 25.2 
             
Total  11.2 10.7 64.6  5.8  24.6 17.2  7.5  8.4  1.4  6.8  34.0 
                        Observations  41,302  4,591 4,591 4,591 4,591 4,591 4,591 4,591 4,591 4,591 4,591 
All sample means calculated using sample weights 
*  The number of days of illness and activity limitation is based on the sub-sample of individuals for whom the illness was not 
ongoing at the time of the interview 
**   Activity limitation refers to reported inability to perform basic tasks of daily living 
***   Other (aggr.) refers to symptoms that are reported with low frequency (Persistent cough w. vomiting; Persistent cough w. blood; 
Skin eruptions); other (rep.) refers to the case where the respondent reported an uncoded or unspecified symptom.  
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Table A 2 ￿ Utilization of health services 
  Visits to formal provider 
(%)*    Choice of care, conditional on reporting illness (%) 
  Uncond. on 
illness 
Cond. on 
illness   Home  TMP  Hospital  Post  Other** 
Poorest  quintile  4.1  46.4    44.0 9.6 17.4  25.4 3.6 
Q2  5.2  50.8    41.7 7.5 17.8  30.5 2.5 
Q3  5.3  50.8    41.7 7.5 16.6  31.8 2.4 
Q4  7.2  56.4    35.8 7.8 20.4  34.5 1.6 
Richest  quintile  7.4  53.0    37.3 9.7 22.2  28.0 2.8 
             
Male  5.3  53.6    38.0 8.4 19.2  31.7 2.6 
Female  6.3  50.7    40.9 8.4 19.2  29.0 2.4 
             
< 1 year old  13.8  68.4    26.9  4.6  20.4  42.9  5.0 
1-4  9.8  61.1    31.7 7.2 22.4  36.7 2.1 
5-15  3.0  50.9    42.5 6.6 15.4  33.8 1.7 
16-45  5.4  49.6    40.6 9.8 19.3  27.3 3.0 
46-60  7.7  45.1    45.1 9.8 20.5  22.5 2.2 
>  60  9.3  42.3    48.1 9.7 16.6  24.0 1.7 
             
Rural    5.4  47.1    42.9 10.0 13.6 31.1  2.4 
Urban  7.5  72.9    25.4 1.7 43.4  26.3 3.2 
             
Niassa  12.6  49.4    38.6 12.0 14.5 34.8  0.2 
Cabo  Delgado  6.1  35.9    51.4 12.6 14.9 20.5  0.5 
Nampula  6.3  59.6    33.6 6.8 13.5  43.6 2.5 
Zambezia  4.9  49.1    36.8 14.1 20.4 27.2  1.4 
Tete  5.4  56.5    42.5 1.1 14.8  36.9 4.8 
Manica  6.7  42.6    48.9 8.5 10.0  29.6 3.0 
Sofala  4.9  48.1    44.7 7.2 18.1  27.3 2.7 
Inhambane  3.4  63.0    33.5 3.6 22.6  32.9 7.5 
Gaza  4.3  61.0    35.6 3.4 31.0  21.7 8.4 
Maputo  10.4  61.2    37.7 1.1 37.2  20.2 3.9 
Maputo  City  3.2  85.7    13.8 0.5 70.4  12.9 2.4 
             
Total  5.8  51.9    39.6 8.4 19.2  30.2 2.5 
                  Observations 41,302  4,591    4,591 4,591 4,591 4,591 4,591 
All sample means calculated using sample weights 
*  Formal providers include hospital, health center, health post, and other formal providers. 
**   Other providers include private clinics and pharmacies.  
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Table A 3 ￿ Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (1) 
  Higest grade completed (%)*     Age  (%) 












  Under 




Poorest  quintile  36.8 43.3 13.2  6.6    51.2 32.3    4.1  13.8 37.7 33.2 11.2 
Q2  30.9 47.0 13.9  8.2    51.3 24.6    3.8  13.8 36.5 34.5 11.3 
Q3  30.8 42.7 18.2  8.3    52.2 24.1    3.9  12.4 34.4 36.6 12.6 
Q4  30.5 41.4 17.9 10.2    51.3 22.0    4.1  11.9 30.8 40.0 13.2 
Richest  quintile  28.2 35.0 17.4 19.4    50.8 21.5    2.8  9.1  25.0 46.0 17.0 
                   
Male  22.7 46.5 18.3 12.5    0.0 23.0    3.7 12.5  34.4  36.0  13.4 
Female  39.8 37.5 14.0  8.8    100.0  26.6    3.8  11.9 31.5 40.1 12.7 
                   
Rural  36.0 45.0 14.0  5.0    51.7 29.7    3.8  12.1 32.8 37.2 14.0 
Urbana  13.8 29.8 24.2 32.2    50.2 6.1    3.6 12.4  33.0 41.4 9.5 
                   
Niassa  36.8 39.1 13.5 10.7    50.2 29.2    3.7  14.7 32.4 36.3 12.9 
Cabo  Delgado  30.6 52.8 12.3  4.3    51.1 39.9    3.9  12.4 28.2 40.5 15.0 
Nampula  29.3 48.4 14.3  8.0    49.9 30.2    3.8  11.9 33.8 38.6 11.9 
Zambezia  38.3 42.9 13.0  5.8    50.4 16.0    3.9  11.2 33.5 39.5 11.9 
Tete  37.9 37.6 16.6  7.9    52.4 44.5    4.4  13.8 37.5 33.5 10.9 
Manica  28.9 44.1 16.1 10.9    50.8 28.6    4.6  14.2 33.0 36.3 11.9 
Sofala  38.1 36.4 15.4 10.0    50.0 23.1    3.4  13.1 32.4 38.8 12.3 
Inhambane  37.4 29.2 20.2 13.1    52.7 24.9    3.2  11.9 32.0 34.8 18.2 
Gaza  26.8 44.8 20.2  8.3    56.4 24.4    3.7  11.7 32.0 34.9 17.7 
Maputo  20.2 46.1 19.4 14.3    55.7 14.1    3.1  12.2 32.3 35.5 17.0 
Maputo  City  5.7  23.8 27.8 42.7    51.4 0.7    3.2 10.2  31.7 45.7 9.2 
                   
Total  31.5 41.9 16.1 10.6    51.4 24.9    3.7  12.2 32.9 38.1 13.1 
                   
Observations: 41,302                   
All sample means calculated using sample weights 
*  In the case of children under 15, highest grade of schooling refers to the highest grade attained by any woman within the 
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Table A 4 ￿ Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (2) 






person  Piped  Open 





                 
Poorest  quintile  7.4  0.3 3.0 36.4    1.9 30.1 1,720  14.4 
Q2  6.7  0.3 3.7 32.6    1.8 34.4 2,869  21.4 
Q3  6.1  0.4 4.3 30.7    2.3 36.4 3,967  20.7 
Q4  5.5  0.4 6.1 32.6    3.7 37.0 5,549  23.0 
Richest  quintile  4.8  0.5 15.6 23.8    10.9 40.5 12,308  30.2 
                 
Male  6.1  0.4 6.9 31.3    4.2 36.0 5,363  22.9 
Female  6.1  0.4 6.2 31.1    4.1 35.4 5,211  21.1 
                 
Rural  5.9  0.4 1.1 38.3    1.6 30.0 4,928  14.5 
Urbana 6.9  0.4  27.8  3.9    13.9  57.8  6,673  50.7 
                 
Niassa  5.8  0.4 0.2 34.6    2.4 57.3 4,864  24.6 
Cabo  Delgado  5.2  0.4 3.9 15.6    1.0 37.5 6,413  19.2 
Nampula  5.4  0.4 4.0 33.4    1.4 29.5 5,316  13.5 
Zambezia  5.4  0.4 0.9 42.9    0.7 14.1 5,061  17.4 
Tete  6.0  0.3 1.8 56.9    1.2 32.5 3,833  15.3 
Manica  6.9  0.3 0.5 36.6    2.2 22.9 6,283  24.4 
Sofala  6.8  0.3 8.0 33.4    3.4 18.8 3,220  17.9 
Inhambane  7.2  0.4 6.8 29.6    6.9 57.1 4,215  25.8 
Gaza  7.1  0.3 6.8 14.0    5.4 60.9 6,079  14.5 
Maputo  7.0  0.3 12.3  14.3    8.1 67.0 5,852  43.6 
Maputo City  7.6  0.3  45.6  0.1    28.0  70.2  8,323  61.2 
                 
Total  6.1  0.4 6.5 31.2    4.1 35.7 5,285  21.9 
                    Observations: 41,302                 
All sample means calculated using sample weights 
*  An individual is considered to be a professional and working if he/she reported having and occupation or profession, and 
reported working in the week preceding the interview. 
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Table A 5 - Independent variables: Estimation of basic health care choice  
  Full sample    Sub-sample of sick 
 Mean  S.D.    Mean  S.D. 
Edu: no education a 0.31  0.46    0.36 0.48 
Edu: less than primary 1  0.42  0.49    0.43 0.49 
Edu: primary 1  0.16  0.37    0.13 0.34 
Edu: primary 2 or more  0.11  0.31    0.08 0.27 
Female 0.51  0.50    0.57 0.50 
Age: under 1  0.04  0.19    0.07 0.25 
Age: 1to 4  0.12  0.33    0.18 0.38 
Age: 5 to 15  0.33  0.47    0.17 0.38 
Age: 16 to 45  0.38  0.49    0.37 0.48 
Age: over 45  0.13  0.34    0.22 0.41 
Consumption b (￿000) 5.29  5.75    5.70 5.28 
Consumption squared (￿000)  61,025  633,511    60,305 261,143 
No-one in HH speaks Port.  0.25  0.43    0.27 0.44 
Num. HH members  6.10  2.85    5.26 2.74 
Occupation and working: indiv. c 0.05  0.21    0.06 0.23 
Occupation and working: HH d 0.22  0.41    0.22 0.41 
Num. HH members per room  0.36  0.21    0.41 0.27 
Inaccessible community e 0.23  0.42    0.23 0.42 
Post or center in community f  0.37 0.48    0.37 0.48 
Urban 0.20  0.40    0.19 0.39 
Travel time to closest facility g 93  189    93 189 
Travel time square  52,405  512,674    56,140 604,426 
Proportion literate in district h   0.46  0.15    0.45 0.14 
Hospital in district i   0.47  0.50    0.42 0.49 
Severity: limitation on activities j 0.07  0.26    0.65 0.48 
Symptom: diarrhea  0.02  0.14    0.17 0.38 
Symptom: cold  0.01  0.09    0.08 0.26 
Symptom: worms  0.00  0.04    0.01 0.12 
Symptom: skin  0.01  0.10    0.08 0.28 
Symptom: cough & vomit  0.00  0.05    0.02 0.15 
Symptom: cough w. blood  0.00  0.04    0.01 0.12 
Symptom: lumps  0.00  0.06    0.03 0.17 
Symptom: other  0.04  0.19    0.34 0.47 
Symptom: malaria  0.03  0.16    0.25 0.43 
a Education refers to own education (highest grade attained) for individuals over 16 years. Younger individuals 
are assigned the highest grade attained by any household member. 
b All consumption variables constructed from data on expenditure, home production, and imputed rent from 
housing and durables. Consumption is deflated by a spatial price index. 
c Individual reports having occupation and having worked during last month. 
d Someone in household reports having occupation and having worked in last month. 
e Community respondent reports that there is a lack of transport to and from community, and that roads are un-
passable for part of the year 
f Community respondent reports that there is a health center or health post in the community 
g Travel time based on individual data￿ 
h District level literacy rate based on 1997 census. 
i Based on administrative data on location of hospitals. 
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Table A 6 - Independent variables: alternative specific time prices 
  Full sample    Sub-sample of sick 
  Mean S.D.    Mean S.D. 
            price: home  0 0    0 0 
price: traditional practitioner  323  991    337 991 
price: hospital  944  1,031    1,021 1,063 
price: post  677  1,198    687 1,185 
price: other  264  161    267 141 
           
price squared: home (￿000)  0  0    0 0 
price squared: trad. pract. (￿000)  1,086  8,185    1,095 8,133 
price squared: hospital (￿000)  1,955  6,153    2,173 6,067 
price squared: post (￿000)  1,894  9,751    1,875 10,415 
price squared: other (￿000)  95  298    91 143 
           
price (home) X cons. interact. (￿000)  0  0    0 0 
price (trad.) X cons. interact. (￿000)  2,127  10,744    2,203 7,504 
price (hosp.) X cons. interact. (￿000)  5,763  13,974    6,528 12,576 
price (post) X cons. interact. (￿000)  3,837  10,190    4,113 9,337 
price (other) X cons. interact. (￿000)  1,913  8,028    1,879 3,533 
Note: There is very limited variation in money prices for health care in Mozambique. For the purposes of this 
analysis, ￿time price￿ variables were used to proxy for price. Time prices were constructed as the product of 
estimates of travel time and the opportunity cost of time (household per capita consumption appropriately 
scaled). 
 
Table A 7 - Independent variables: Illness equation 
  Full sample    Sub-sample of sick 
  Mean S.D.    Mean S.D. 
Water source: piped  0.07  0.25    0.04 0.19 
Water source: river or open srce.  0.31  0.46    0.33 0.47 
Sanitation: WC  0.04  0.20    0.02 0.15 
Sanitation: latrine  0.36  0.48    0.36 0.48 
High district health exp.a 0.13  0.34    0.13 0.34 
Low district health exp.  0.07  0.26    0.13 0.33 
Month of interview: Jan.  0.08  0.28    0.06 0.24 
Month of interview: Feb.  0.12  0.32    0.13 0.34 
Month of interview: March  0.10  0.30    0.10 0.30 
Month of interview: April  0.10  0.30    0.14 0.35 
Month of interview: May  0.09  0.28    0.11 0.31 
Month of interview: June  0.10  0.29    0.10 0.29 
Month of interview: July  0.08  0.27    0.07 0.26 
Month of interview: Aug.  0.03  0.18    0.02 0.14 
Month of interview: Sept.  0.08  0.28    0.07 0.26 
Month of interview: Oct.  0.07  0.26    0.07 0.25 
Month of interview: Nov.  0.07  0.26    0.05 0.23 
Month of interview: Dec.  0.07  0.26    0.07 0.26 
a Districts were classified as high, middle, or low spending on the basis of regression analysis of district level 
spending. Standard determinants of health care expenditures--￿ --were included in regression. A district was 
considered high spending if the residual...  
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Table A 8 ￿ Probit results: visit conditional on illness 
  Model A    Model B    Model C   
 Coef.  se. Coef.  se. Coef.  se. 
Edu: no education  -0.181  0.072* -0.180  0.073* -0.183 0.072* 
Edu: primary 1  0.299  0.091** 0.298  0.091** 0.287  0.092** 
Edu: primary 2 or more  0.253  0.156 0.250 0.157 0.268  0.154 
Female 0.003  0.055 0.003 0.055 0.000  0.055 
Age: under 1  0.606  0.126** 0.607  0.126** 0.606  0.122** 
Age: 1to 4  0.278  0.106** 0.278  0.106** 0.264  0.102* 
Age: 5 to 15  -0.080  0.108 -0.079 0.109 -0.078  0.106 
Age: over 45  0.048  0.075 0.048 0.075 0.053  0.075 
Consumption 1.8E-05  6.5E-06** 2.0E-05  1.2E-05    
Consumption squared      -5.4E-11  2.0E-10    
Quintile 2         0.113  0.111 
Quintile 3         0.138  0.100 
Quintile 4         0.288  0.118* 
Quintile 5         0.212  0.122 
No-one in HH speaks Port.  -0.170  0.094 -0.169 0.094 -0.158  0.095 
Num. HH members  0.034  0.012** 0.034  0.012** 0.038  0.013** 
Occupation and working: indiv.  0.125  0.121 0.125 0.121 0.136  0.118 
Occupation and working: HH  0.377  0.084** 0.376  0.084** 0.377  0.084** 
Num. HH members per room  -0.070  0.120 -0.073 0.123 -0.011  0.120 
Inaccessible community  -0.183  0.080* -0.184  0.080* -0.184 0.081* 
Post or center in community  0.441  0.092** 0.441  0.092** 0.453  0.092** 
Urban -0.404  0.178* -0.404  0.178* -0.389 0.174* 
Travel time to closest facility  -0.001  0.000** -0.001  0.000** -0.001  0.000** 
Travel time square  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
Proportion literate in district  0.708  0.486 0.708 0.486 0.693  0.475 
Hospital in district  0.220  0.094* 0.219  0.094* 0.222 0.092* 
Severity: limitation on activities  0.158  0.060** 0.159  0.059** 0.157  0.059** 
Symptom: diarrhea  0.045  0.113 0.045 0.113 0.040  0.109 
Symptom: cold  -0.244  0.108* -0.244  0.108* -0.246 0.108* 
Symptom: worms  -0.015  0.218 -0.015 0.218 -0.007  0.214 
Symptom: skin  -0.044  0.156 -0.044 0.156 -0.032  0.157 
Symptom: cough & vomit  -0.185  0.171 -0.185 0.171 -0.167  0.170 
Symptom: cough w. blood  0.362  0.269 0.363 0.269 0.350  0.270 
Symptom: lumps  -0.361  0.155* -0.360  0.155* -0.373 0.159* 
Symptom: other  -0.017  0.086 -0.017 0.085 -0.022  0.085 
Constant -0.600  0.355 -0.612 0.353 -0.704  0.361 
              Observations: 4,591           
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
Provincial dummies not reported           
            Wald test of joint significance of consumption variables (Prob>chi2)  0.095   0.185   
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Table A 9 ￿ Probit results for sub-populations: visit conditional on illness 
  Not poor    Poor      Rural    Urban   
 Coef.  se. Coef.  se.    Coef.  se. Coef.  se. 
Edu: no education  -0.340  0.126**  -0.109  0.090    -0.182  0.082* -0.176  0.125 
Edu: primary 1  0.198  0.127 0.346  0.106**    0.361  0.111** 0.189  0.105 
Edu: primary 2 or more  0.176  0.225 0.234  0.182    0.337  0.235 0.153  0.187 
Female 0.071  0.098 -0.046  0.072    0.037  0.062 -0.108  0.092 
Age: under 1  0.832  0.256**  0.521  0.138**    0.547  0.140** 1.240  0.301** 
Age: 1to 4  0.318  0.202 0.241  0.104*    0.309  0.122* 0.121  0.169 
Age: 5 to 15  -0.088  0.141 -0.075  0.131    -0.023  0.126 -0.267  0.164 
Age: over 45  0.107  0.134 -0.027  0.100    0.084  0.087 -0.092  0.115 
Consumption 1.2E-05  7.0E-06 4.3E-05 4.0E-05    2.2E-05  7.4E-06** 6.1E-06  7.4E-06 
No-one in HH speaks Port.  -0.140  0.167 -0.167  0.108    -0.173  0.098 -0.688  0.238** 
Num. HH members  0.067  0.024**  0.033  0.016*    0.035  0.014* 0.036  0.024 
Occupation and working: indiv.  0.069  0.188 0.189  0.152    0.119  0.137 -0.041  0.205 
Occupation and working: HH  0.429  0.148**  0.336  0.106**    0.337  0.105** 0.399  0.124** 
Num. HH members per room  -0.055  0.171 -0.074  0.224    -0.160  0.151 0.296  0.170 
Inaccessible community  -0.189  0.151 -0.182  0.086*         
Post or center in community  0.609  0.132**  0.371  0.116**         
Urban -0.314  0.255 -0.420  0.223         
Travel time to closest facility  -0.002  0.001**  -0.001  0.000*    -0.001  0.000** -0.026  0.007** 
Travel time square  0.000  0.000* 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000** 
Proportion literate in district  -0.415  0.754 1.185  0.594*    1.324  0.661* -1.551  0.878 
Hospital in district  0.383  0.143**  0.122  0.093    0.259  0.101* 0.543  0.371 
Severity: limitation on activities  0.094  0.107 0.208  0.069**    0.161  0.064* 0.343  0.102** 
Symptom: diarrhea  0.107  0.162 0.025  0.123    0.160  0.119 -0.475  0.158** 
Symptom: cold  -0.417  0.180* -0.137  0.129    -0.202  0.115 -0.362  0.248 
Symptom: worms  -0.617  0.347 0.241  0.244    0.082  0.234 -0.597  0.581 
Symptom: skin  -0.128  0.183 0.024  0.186    0.014  0.179 -0.267  0.231 
Symptom: cough & vomit  -0.622  0.301* -0.033  0.189    -0.197  0.193 -0.403  0.302 
Symptom: cough w. blood  0.873  0.441* 0.183  0.371    0.304  0.295 0.193  0.528 
Symptom: lumps  -0.571  0.242* -0.233  0.211    -0.408  0.167* -0.417  0.320 
Symptom: other  -0.156  0.120 0.088  0.094    0.028  0.097 -0.267  0.140 
Constant -0.089  0.541 -0.938  0.450*    -0.662  0.427 1.456  0.493** 
                    Observations 1,742    2,849      3,222   1,369  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%               
Provincial dummies not reported                 
                   
Chow test (Prob>chi2)                  
All variables       0.007         0.000   
Education variables       0.426         0.721   
Age variables       0.707         0.038   
Access      0.037         0.000   
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Table A 10 ￿ Selection model: Heckprobit 
  Illness reporting    Selection probit    Standard probit   
 Coef.  se. Coef.  se. Coef.  se. 
Edu: no education  -0.052  0.040 -0.178  0.077* -0.181  0.072* 
Edu: primary 1  -0.070  0.051 0.301  0.096** 0.299  0.091** 
Edu: primary 2 or more  -0.041  0.057 0.255  0.157 0.253 0.156 
Female 0.144  0.026** -0.002  0.075 0.003 0.055 
Age: under 1  0.446  0.080** 0.590  0.209** 0.606  0.126** 
Age: 1to 4  0.289  0.048** 0.267  0.153 0.278 0.106** 
Age: 5 to 15  -0.278  0.041** -0.070  0.158 -0.080 0.108 
Age: over 45  0.338  0.033** 0.036  0.155 0.048 0.075 
Consumption 5.2E-07  2.3E-06 1.8E-05  6.5E-06** 1.8E-05 6.5E-06** 
No-one in HH speaks Port.  -0.066  0.037 -0.167  0.099 -0.170 0.094 
Num. HH members  -0.047  0.007** 0.036  0.020 0.034 0.012** 
Occupation and working: indiv.  0.043  0.065 0.123  0.120 0.125 0.121 
Occupation and working: HH  0.060  0.052 0.374  0.092 0.377 0.084** 
Num. HH members per room  0.277  0.076** -0.079  0.151 -0.070 0.120 
Inaccessible community  -0.027  0.040 -0.181  0.088* -0.183  0.080* 
Post or center in community  0.049  0.048 0.439  0.096** 0.441  0.092** 
Urban -0.080  0.113 -0.403  0.181* -0.404  0.178* 
Travel time to closest facility  0.000  0.000 -0.001  0.000** -0.001  0.000** 
Travel time square  0.000  0.000** 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Proportion literate in district  0.518  0.322 0.693  0.531 0.708 0.486 
Hospital in district  -0.071  0.041 0.223  0.097* 0.220  0.094* 
Severity: limitation on activities      0.158  0.061** 0.158  0.060** 
Symptoms not reported          
Water source: piped  -0.128  0.062*        
Water source: open  0.063  0.037        
Sanitation: WC  -0.117  0.072        
Sanitation: latrine  0.020  0.039        
High district health exp.  0.048  0.067        
Low district health exp.  0.133  0.067*        
Month of interview: Jan.  -0.028  0.130        
Month of interview: Feb.  0.221  0.128        
Month of interview: March  0.213  0.132        
Month of interview: April  0.355  0.132**        
Month of interview: May  0.294  0.126*        
Month of interview: June  0.199  0.127        
Month of interview: July  0.162  0.132        
Month of interview: Sept.  0.142  0.141        
Month of interview: Oct.  0.128  0.125        
Month of interview: Nov.  -0.038  0.137        
Month of interview: Dec.  0.133  0.136        
Constant -2.125  0.248** -0.500  1.160 -0.600 0.355 
              Observations 41,302    41,302    4,591   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
Provincial dummies not reported             
             
Wald test of independent eq. (ρ=0) Prob>chi2   0.925       
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Table A 11 ￿ Fixed and random effect logits 
  Fixed effects logit    Random effects logit   Standard  logit   
 Coef.  se. Coef.  se. Coef.  se. 
Edu: no education  -0.159  0.113 -0.178  0.102 -0.177  0.094 
Edu: primary 1  0.382  0.132** 0.475  0.124** 0.487 0.116** 
Edu: primary 2 or more  0.368  0.177* 0.442  0.164** 0.477 0.153** 
Female -0.059  0.086 -0.044  0.082 -0.030  0.077 
Age: under 1  1.501  0.207** 1.405  0.198** 1.272 0.188** 
Age: 1to 4  0.488  0.131** 0.449  0.123** 0.405 0.115** 
Age: 5 to 15  -0.210  0.122 -0.188  0.115 -0.177  0.109 
Age: over 45  0.042  0.117 0.037  0.109 0.030  0.103 
Consumption 2.3E-05  9.8E-06* -4.1E-01 1.0E-01* 1.4E-05  7.4E-06* 
No-one in HH speaks Port.  -0.447  0.119** 0.043  0.016** -0.367 0.093** 
Num. HH members  0.045  0.018* 0.000  0.000* 0.037  0.014** 
Occupation and working: indiv. 0.189  0.191 0.143  0.184 0.089  0.173 
Occupation and working: HH  0.427  0.131** 0.424  0.113** 0.432 0.102** 
Num. HH members per room  0.101  0.197 0.095  0.177 0.091  0.161 
Inaccessible community      -0.165  0.123 -0.180  0.095 
Post or center in community    0.480  0.131** 0.472 0.101** 
Urban     -0.375  0.210 -0.411  0.161* 
Travel time to closest facility    -0.001  0.001 -0.001  0.001* 
Travel time square      0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000* 
Proportion literate in district    0.475  0.475 0.460  0.365 
Hospital in district      0.240  0.122 0.257  0.096** 
Severity: limitation on 
activities 0.468  0.092** 0.405  0.083** 0.337 0.076** 
Symptom: diarrhea  -0.232  0.149 -0.129  0.135 -0.088  0.124 
Symptom: cold  -0.449  0.187* -0.354  0.169* -0.306  0.155* 
Symptom: worms  -0.141  0.345 -0.238  0.321 -0.242  0.302 
Symptom: skin  -0.122  0.173 -0.078  0.159 -0.089  0.147 
Symptom: cough & vomit  -0.408  0.283 -0.299  0.264 -0.226  0.246 
Symptom: cough w. blood  -0.028  0.329 0.066  0.312 0.091  0.290 
Symptom: lumps  -0.682  0.271* -0.567  0.250* -0.462  0.232* 
Symptom: other  -0.112  0.113 -0.143  0.103 -0.147  0.095 
Constant     -0.793  0.288** -0.730 0.239** 
              Observations:  3,583          
              Note: 1,008 observations dropped because all zeros or ones within groups; community level dropped in FE model 
because no within-group variation 
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Table A 12 ￿ Multinomial logit model 
 TMP   Hospital   Post   Other   
 Coef.  se Coef.  se Coef.  se Coef.  se 
Edu: no education  0.225  0.246 -0.329 0.144* -0.235  0.162 0.111  0.339 
Edu: primary 1  -0.374  0.329 0.433 0.174* 0.436  0.192* 1.408 0.415** 
Edu: primary 2 or more  -0.203  0.504 0.728 0.287* 0.193  0.322 0.182  0.529 
Female -0.191  0.188 0.087 0.116 -0.065 0.113 -0.135  0.232 
Age: under 1  -0.249  0.454 0.991 0.221** 0.901  0.254** 1.236  0.478* 
Age: 1to 4  0.111  0.327 0.557 0.198** 0.484  0.196* -0.077 0.440 
Age: 5 to 15  -0.288  0.298 -0.435 0.195* -0.018  0.204 -0.837  0.404* 
Age: over 45  -0.177  0.248 0.299 0.149* -0.035  0.159 -0.549  0.307 
Consumption 3.3E-05  1.7E-05 3.3E-05  1.3E-05** 3.9E-05 1.3E-05** 3.7E-05  2.7E-05 
No-one in HH speaks Port.  0.224  0.211 -0.576 0.212** -0.138  0.181 0.585  0.337 
Num. HH members  -0.008  0.038 0.058 0.026* 0.044  0.025 0.124  0.040** 
Occupation and working: indiv.  -0.915  0.441* 0.056  0.283 0.011 0.231 0.039  0.580 
Occupation and working: HH  0.719  0.412 0.731 0.176** 0.728  0.205** 1.249  0.384** 
Num. HH members per room  -0.042  0.381 0.105 0.248 -0.411 0.294 0.582  0.331 
Inaccessible community  0.134  0.198 -0.293 0.236 -0.290 0.177 -0.016  0.475 
Post or center in community  -0.070  0.295 0.601 0.218** 0.827  0.200** -0.184  0.452 
Urban -1.251  0.593* 0.252  0.384 -1.477 0.494** 0.290  0.692 
Travel time to closest facility  0.001  0.002 -0.002 0.001* -0.001  0.001 0.005  0.003 
Travel time square  -4.1E-07  1.2E-06 2.7E-07  1.2E-07* 9.2E-08  1.0E-07 -1.0E-05  6.2E-06 
Proportion literate in district  2.611  1.461 0.088 1.043 2.265 1.316 0.176  1.646 
Hospital in district  -0.198  0.307 0.323 0.232 0.322 0.201 0.334  0.389 
Severity: limitation on activities  0.595  0.182** 0.641  0.117** 0.224  0.124 -0.088  0.303 
Symptom: diarrhea  -0.173  0.351 -0.366 0.191 0.226 0.263 0.183  0.448 
Symptom: cold  -0.092  0.417 -0.180 0.221 -0.495 0.209* -0.432 0.543 
Symptom: worms  -0.079  0.533 -0.537 0.533 0.180 0.396 -0.278  1.277 
Symptom: skin  -0.695  0.369 -0.111 0.305 -0.113 0.299 -0.491  0.600 
Symptom: cough & vomit  0.079  0.498 -0.497 0.380 -0.187 0.335 -0.766  0.753 
Symptom: cough w. blood  -2.065  1.061 1.154 0.519* -0.085  0.504 -0.807  1.094 
Symptom: lumps  -0.158  0.487 -0.595 0.425 -0.567 0.286* -2.359 1.154* 
Symptom: other  0.280  0.234 0.235 0.178 -0.055 0.169 -0.120  0.383 
Constant -4.540  1.504** -1.563  0.781* -2.729  0.912** -4.708  1.265** 
                  Observations:  4,591               
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Provincial dummies not reported                 
                 
Wald test: all coefficients associated with given variable(s) are zero         
Model A               
Consumption 0.024             
Model B               
Consumption 0.327             
Consumption squared  0.707             
Model C               
Quintile 2  0.176             
Quintile 3  0.235             
Quintile 4  0.027             
Quintile 5  0.343             
All quintiles  0.265              
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Table A 13 ￿ Multinomial logit: Alternative-specific coefficents 
 TMP    Hospital    Post    Other   
 Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se  Coef.  se 
Edu: no education  0.218  0.253  -0.355  0.145*  -0.265  0.160  0.060  0.343 
Edu: primary 1  -0.376  0.320  0.419  0.177*  0.408  0.182 * 1.319  0.414** 
Edu: primary 2 or more  -0.193  0.527  0.718  0.289*  0.159  0.325  0.214  0.505 
Female -0.189  0.187  0.089  0.116  -0.065  0.116  -0.177  0.224 
Age: under 1  -0.222  0.451  0.960  0.223**  0.859  0.245 ** 1.128  0.504* 
Age: 1to 4  0.105  0.323  0.540  0.198**  0.466  0.190 * -0.162  0.442 
Age: 5 to 15  -0.291  0.297  -0.437  0.194*  -0.011  0.199  -0.932  0.391* 
Age: over 45  -0.196  0.241  0.304  0.149*  0.000  0.163  -0.518  0.303 
Consumption 2.8E-05  3.9E-05  2.3E-05  2.7E-05  3.6E-05  3.3E-05  -6.7E-05  7.5E-05 
Consumption squared  -8.7E-11  5.3E-10  1.8E-10  4.6E-10  -1.6E-10  5.6E-10  2.4E-10  7.2E-10 
Price: TMP  -5.6E-05  2.7E-04  1.2E-04  4.4E-05**  -7.0E-06  7.7E-05  8.4E-05  1.3E-04 
Price: Hospital  -6.1E-05  6.2E-05  -3.6E-04  2.1E-04  -6.0E-05  7.2E-05  -2.3E-04  1.8E-04 
Price: Post  7.4E-05  5.2E-05  -3.1E-04  1.5E-04*  -3.7E-04  1.2E-04 ** -1.7E-04  8.4E-05* 
Price: Other  -5.7E-04  1.1E-03  1.9E-03  6.7E-04**  1.6E-03  6.8E-04 * 1.9E-03  2.1E-03 
Own price squared  9.3E-10  2.7E-08  6.6E-08  2.9E-08*  2.3E-08  9.0E-09 * -4.5E-07  1.6E-06 
Own price-cons. interaction  1.6E-08  1.5E-08  -7.8E-09  9.8E-09  2.5E-09  1.1E-08  1.1E-07  7.4E-08 
No-one in HH speaks Port.  0.278  0.217  -0.582  0.209**  -0.167  0.180  0.464  0.341 
Num. HH members  -0.008  0.039  0.052  0.026*  0.046  0.026  0.097  0.042* 
Occupation and working: indiv.  -0.888  0.440*  0.076  0.280  0.000  0.230  0.035  0.580 
Occupation and working: HH  0.749  0.413  0.712  0.175**  0.685  0.202 ** 1.207  0.383** 
Num. HH members per room  -0.047  0.381  0.145  0.250  -0.370  0.302  0.667  0.369 
Inaccessible community  0.151  0.193  -0.422  0.241  -0.366  0.190  -0.055  0.467 
Urban -1.525  0.516**  0.562  0.376  -0.798  0.435  -0.035  0.540 
Proportion literate in district  2.675  1.477  0.604  1.169  2.338  1.254  0.403  1.644 
Severity: limitation on activities  0.594  0.181**  0.657  0.113**  0.250  0.120 * -0.058  0.288 
Symptom: diarrhea  -0.128  0.357  -0.382  0.192*  0.178  0.250  0.168  0.464 
Symptom: cold  -0.070  0.416  -0.232  0.228  -0.559  0.207 ** -0.535  0.553 
Symptom: worms  -0.065  0.531  -0.469  0.510  0.158  0.384  0.075  1.201 
Symptom: skin  -0.661  0.364  -0.120  0.309  -0.137  0.300  -0.357  0.634 
Symptom: cough & vomit  0.090  0.512  -0.590  0.390  -0.265  0.329  -0.628  0.725 
Symptom: cough w. blood  -1.974  1.059  0.959  0.503  -0.215  0.513  -0.741  1.066 
Symptom: lumps  -0.120  0.481  -0.762  0.434  -0.705  0.290 * -2.462  1.139* 
Symptom: other  0.297  0.241  0.236  0.184  -0.062  0.161  -0.104  0.372 
Constant -4.312  1.499**  -1.886  0.827*  -2.811  0.870 ** -4.544  1.329** 
                  
Observations: 4,591                  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%              
Provincial dummies not reported                  
                  
Tests                
All price-related coeff. equal zero (P>chi2)  0.0010           
All cross-price coeff. equal zero (P>chi2)  0.0004           
Coeff. on own price equal across alt. (P>chi2)  0.0030           
Coeff. on own price squared = -2 * coeff. on price-cons. interact. (P>chi2)  0.3682           
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Table A 14 ￿ Predicted probabilities with confidence intervals for different specifications 
 Home  TMP  Hospital  Post  Other 
 Prob.  CI  Prob.  CI  Prob.  CI  Prob.  CI  Prob.  CI 
Consumption enters as continuous variable               
Q1  0.49  (0.43, 0.55)  0.05  (0.04, 0.06)  0.13  (0.11, 0.14)  0.31  (0.27, 0.35)  0.03  (0.02, 0.03) 
Q2  0.48  (0.42, 0.54)  0.05  (0.04, 0.06)  0.13  (0.11, 0.15)  0.31  (0.28, 0.35)  0.03  (0.02, 0.03) 
Q3  0.47  (0.42, 0.54)  0.05  (0.04, 0.06)  0.13  (0.12, 0.15)  0.32  (0.28, 0.36)  0.03  (0.02, 0.03) 
Q4  0.46  (0.40, 0.53)  0.05  (0.04, 0.06)  0.13  (0.12, 0.15)  0.32  (0.28, 0.37)  0.03  (0.02, 0.03) 
Q5  0.43  (0.37, 0.50)  0.05  (0.05, 0.06)  0.14  (0.12, 0.17)  0.34  (0.29, 0.40)  0.03  (0.02, 0.03) 
                      Quintile dummies                     
Q1  0.51  (0.43, 0.58)  0.06  (0.05, 0.07)  0.13  (0.11, 0.15)  0.27  (0.23, 0.31)  0.04  (0.03, 0.04) 
Q2  0.48  (0.40, 0.56)  0.04  (0.04, 0.05)  0.13  (0.11, 0.16)  0.32  (0.26, 0.37)  0.03  (0.02, 0.03) 
Q3  0.48  (0.41, 0.55)  0.04  (0.04, 0.05)  0.12  (0.10, 0.14)  0.34  (0.29, 0.39)  0.02  (0.02, 0.03) 
Q4  0.42  (0.34, 0.51)  0.04  (0.04, 0.05)  0.15  (0.12, 0.18)  0.37  (0.30, 0.44)  0.02  (0.01, 0.02) 
Q5  0.45  (0.36, 0.54)  0.06  (0.05, 0.07)  0.14  (0.11, 0.17)  0.33  (0.27, 0.40)  0.03  (0.02, 0.03) 
Note: Predicted probabilities were calculated for a ￿representative￿ individual. All variables except the income related variable were kept at their 
means. Estimates are based on a simple MNLM, without alternative-specific prices. 
 
Table A 15 ￿ Change in predicted probabilities at means for changes in determinants 
 Home  TMP  Hospital  Post  Other 
Education       
No  education  0.45 0.08 0.17 0.29 0.02 
<  Primary  1  0.40 0.05 0.20 0.33 0.01 
Primary  1  0.30 0.03 0.23 0.40 0.04 
Primary 2 or more  0.29  0.03  0.32  0.34  0.01 
           
Command of Portuguese       
No one speak Port  0.37  0.05  0.24  0.33  0.01 
Someone  speak  Port.  0.44 0.07 0.14 0.32 0.03 
           
Health post or center in village       
No  PSCS  0.45 0.06 0.19 0.27 0.02 
PSCS  0.33 0.05 0.22 0.40 0.01 
           
Hospital in district       
No  hospital  0.43 0.07 0.18 0.30 0.01 
Hospital  0.35 0.04 0.24 0.35 0.02 
           
Travel time       
15  0.36 0.05 0.22 0.34 0.02 
45  0.38 0.05 0.21 0.33 0.02 
75  0.39 0.06 0.21 0.33 0.03 
105  0.40 0.06 0.20 0.32 0.03 
135  0.41 0.06 0.19 0.31 0.03 
165  0.42 0.06 0.18 0.30 0.03 
195  0.43 0.07 0.18 0.29 0.03 
225  0.44 0.07 0.17 0.29 0.03 
Note: Predicted probabilities were calculated for a ￿representative￿ individual. All variables except the income 
related variable were kept at their means. 
  
 
￿ 33 ￿ 
 
REFERENCES 
Acton, J. P. 1975. "Nonmonetary Factors in the Demand for Medical Services: Some Empirical 
Evidence." Journal of Political Economy, 87:3, pp. 595-614. 
Akin, J., C. Griffin, D. K. Guilkey, and B. M. Popkin. 1986. "The Demand for Primary Health 
Care Services in the Bicol Region of the Philippines." Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 34:4, pp. 755-82. 
Akin, J., D. Guilkey, and H. Denton. 1995. "Quality of Services and Demand for Health Care in 
Nigeria: A Multinomial Probit Estimation." Social Sciences and Medicine, 40:11, pp. 1527-
37. 
Akin, J., D. K. Guilkey, P. Hutchinson, and M. McIntosh. 1998. "Price Elasticities of Demand for 
Curative Health Care with Control for Sample Selectivity on Endogenous Illness: An 
Analysis for Sri Lanka." Health Economics, 7:6, pp. 509-31. 
Akin, J., S, C. Griffin, D. K. Guilkey, and B. M. Popkin. 1984. The Demand for Primary Health 
Care in Developing Countries. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams. 
Baker, J. L. and J. van der Gaag. 1993. "Equity in the Finance and Delivery of Health Care: 
Evidence from Five Developing Countries," in Equity in the Finance and Delivery of Health 
Care. Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Rutten eds. London: Oxford University Press. 
Beattie, A. and D. Kraushaar. 1999. "Health Expenditure in Mozambique: An Analysis of Major 
Policy Issues." Management Sciences for Health. Processed. 
Becker, G. 1965. "A theory of the allocation of time." Economic Journal, 75, pp. 493-517. 
Bolduc, D., G. Lacroix, and C. Muller. 1996. "The choice of medical providers in rural Benin: a 
comparison of discrete choice models." Journal of Health Economics, 15, pp. 477-98. 
Cabral, Z. 1999. "A Study of Access to Basic Education and Health in Mozambique." Oxfam, 
Maputo. Processed. 
Castro Leal, F., J. Dayton, L. Demery, and K. Mehra. 2000. "Public spending on health care in 
Africa: do the poor benefit?" Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 78:1, pp. 66-74. 
Creese, A. L. and J. Kutzin. 1997. "Lessons from Cost Recovery in Health," in Marketizing 
education and health in developing countries: Miracle or mirage? Colclough ed. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. pages 37-62. 
Culyer, A. J. 1989. "The Normative Economics of Health Care Finance and Provision." Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 5:1, pp. 34-58. 
Culyer, A. J. and A. Wagstaff. 1993. "Equity and Equality in Health and Health Care." Journal of 
Health Economics, 12:4, pp. 431-57. 
Datt, G., K. Simler, S. Mukherjee, and G. Dava. 2000. "Determinants of poverty in Mozambique: 
1996-97." FCND discussion paper 78. IFPRI.  
de Ferranti, D. 1985. "Paying for Health Services in Developing Countries: An Overview." Staff 
Working Paper 670. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Demery, L. 2000. "Benefit Incidence Analysis." Processed. 
Dor, A., P. Gertler, and J. van der Gaag. 1987. "Non-price Rationing and the Choice of Medical 
Care Providers in Rural Cote d’Ivoire." Journal of Health Economics, 6:4, pp. 291-304. 
Dor, A. and J. van der Gaag. 1993. "Quality rationing and the demand of adults for medical care in 
rural Cote d’Ivoire," in Health Economics Research in Developing Countries. Mills and Lee 
eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 193-213. 
Dow, W. H. 1996a. "Discrete Choice Estimation of Price-Elasticities: The Benefits of a Flexible 
Behavioural Model of Health Care Demand." Processed.  
 
￿ 34 ￿ 
 
Dow, W. H. 1996b. "Unconditional Demand for Health Care in C￿te d’Ivoire; Does Selection on 
Health Status Matter." Vol. Living Standards Measurement Study Working Paper. World 
Bank: Washington, D.C. 
Gertler, P. and J. Hammer. 1997. "Strategies for Pricing Publicly Provided Health Services." 
Processed.  
Gertler, P., L. Locay, and W. Sanderson. 1987. "Are user fees regressive? The welfare 
implications of health care financing proposals in Peru." Journal of Econometrics, 36:suppl., 
pp. 67-88. 
Gertler, P. and J. van der Gaag. 1990. The willingness to pay for medical care: Evidence from 
two developing countries. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the 
World Bank. 
Gertler, P. J. and J. Molyneaux. 1997. "Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Raising User Fees 
for Publicly Delivered Health Care Services: Utilization, Health Outcomes, and Private 
Provider Response." Processed. 
Gilson, L. 1997. "The lessons of user fee experience in Africa." Health Policy and Planning, 12:4, 
pp. 273-85. 
Griffin, C. 1992. "Welfare Gains from User Charges for Government Health Services." Health 
Policy and Planning, 7, pp. 177-80. 
Grossman, M. 1972a. "The Demand for Health: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation." Vol. 
NBER Occasional Paper. Columbia University Press: New York. 
Grossman, M. 1972b. "On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health." Journal of 
Political Economy, 80:2, pp. 223-55. 
Grossman, M. 2000. "The Human Capital Model," in Handbook of Health Economics. Culyer and 
Newhouse eds: Elsevier Science B. V. 
Haddad, S. and P. Fournier. 1995. "Quality, Cost and Utilization of Health Services in Developing 
Countries: A Longitudinal Study in Zaire." Social Science and Medicine, 40:6, pp. 743-53. 
Heller, P. S. 1982. "A Model of the Demand for Medical and Health Services in Peninsular 
Malaysia." Social Science and Medicine, 16, pp. 267-84. 
Heltberg, R., K. R. Simler, and F. Tarp. 2001. "Public Spending and Poverty in Mozambique." DP 
2001/63. WIDER Institute.  
Hurley, J. 2000. "An Overview of the Normative Economics of the Health Sector," in Handbook 
of Health Economics. Culyer and Newhouse eds: Elsevier Science B. V. 
Hutchinson, P. 1999. "Health Care in Uganda: Selected Issues." World Bank Discussion Paper 
404: Washington D.C. 
Jack, W. 1999. Principles of health economics for developing countries. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 
Jimenez, E. 1989. "Social Sector Pricing Policy Revisited: A Survey of Some Recent 
Controversies," in Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development 
Economics 1989. Fischer and de-Tray eds. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, pp. 109-38. 
Jimenez, E. 1995. "Human and Physical Infrastructure: Public Investment and Pricing Policies in 
Developing Countries," in Handbook of development economics. Volume 3B. Handbooks in 
Economics, vol. 9. Behrman and Srinivasan eds. Amsterdam; New York and Oxford: 
Elsevier Science, pp. ages 2773-843. 
Lavy, V. and J.-M. Germain. 1994. "Quality and Cost in Health Care Choice in Developing 
Countries." Living Standards Measurement Study Working Paper 105. World Bank.   
 
￿ 35 ￿ 
 
Lavy, V. and J. M. Quigley. 1991. "Willingness to Pay for the Quality and Intensity of Medical 
Care: Evidence from Low Income Households in Ghana." World Bank and Hebrew U 
Jerusalem; U CA at Berkeley. 
Litvack, J. and C. Bodart. 1993. "User fees plus quality equals improved access to health care: 
results of A field experiment in Cameroon." Social Science and Medicine, 37:3, pp. 369-83. 
Makinen, M., H. Waters, and M. Rauch. 1999. "Conventional Wisdom and Empirical Data on 
Inequalities in Morbidity, Use of Services and Health Expenditures." Partnership for Health 
Reform. Processed. 
Makinen, M., H. Waters, M. Rauch, N. Almagambetova, R. Bitran, L. Gilson, D. McIntyre, S. 
Pannarunothai, A. L. Prieto, G. Ubilla, and S. Ram. 2000. "Inequalities in health care use 
and expenditures: empirical data from eight developing countries and countries in 
transition." Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 78:1, pp. 55-65. 
Manning, W. G., J. P. Newhouse, N. Daan, E. Keeler, B. Benjamin, A. Leibowitz, M. S. Marquis, 
and J. Zwanziger. 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Health Care: Evidence from 
a Randomized Experiment." American Economic Review, 77:3, pp. 251-77. 
McFadden, D. 1973. "Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behaviour," in Frontiers of 
Econometrics. Zarembka ed. New York: Academic Press, pp. 105-42. 
McFadden, D. 1981. "Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice," in Structural Analyssi of 
Discrete Data: With Econometric Applications. Manski and McFadden eds. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
McFadden, D. 1984. "Econometric Analysis of Qualitative Response Models," in Handbook of 
Econometrics. Griliches and Intriligator eds: Elsevier Science Publishers. 
McPake, B., K. Hanson, and A. Mills. 1993. "Community financing of health care in Africa: an 
evaluation of the Bamako initiative." Social Science & Medicine, 36:11, pp. 1383-95. 
MPF. 1998. "Understanding Poverty and Well-Being in Mozambique: The First National 
Assessment (1996-97)." Ministry of Planning and Finance (Mozambique), Universidade 
Eduardo Mondlane, International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Mwabu, G. 1986. "Health Care Decisions at Household Level: Results of Health Survey in 
Kenya." Social Science and Medicine, 22:3, pp. 313-9. 
Mwabu, G., M. Ainsworth, and A. Nyamete. 1993. "Quality of Medical Care and Choice of 
Medical Treatment in Kenya: An Empirical Analysis." Journal of Human Resources, 28:4, 
pp. 838-62. 
Mwabu, G. M. 1989. "Nonmonetary Factors in the Household Choice of Medical Facilities." 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 37:2, pp. 383-92. 
Newbrander, W., D. Collins, and L. Gilson. 1997. "Equity in the Provision of Health Care: 
Ensuring Access of the Poor to Services under User Fee System." Processed. 
Reddy, S. and J. Vandemoortele. 1996. "User Financing of Basic Social Services: A Review of 
Theoretical Arguments and Empirical Evidence." Office of Evaluation, Policy and 
Planning. UNICEF. 
Sahn, D. E. and S. D. Younger. 2000. "Expenditure incidence in Africa: microeconomic 
evidence." Fiscal Studies, 21:3, pp. 329-48. 
Sauerbon, R. A., A. Nougtara, and E. Latimer. 1994. "The Elasticity of the Demand for Health 
Care in Burkina Faso: Differences Across Age and Income Groups." Health Policy and 
Planning, 9:2, pp. 185-92. 
Shaw, P. and M. Ainsworth. 1994. "Financing Health Services Through User Fees and Insurance: 
Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa." Africa Technical Department, World Bank, Washington, 
DC.   
 
￿ 36 ￿ 
 
Smith, R. J. and R. W. Blundell. 1986. "An exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation Tobit 
model with an application to labor supply." Econometrica, 54:4, pp. 679-86. 
Train, K. 1986. Qualitative choice analysis : theory, econometrics, and an application to 
automobile demand. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
van de Walle, D. 1995. "The distribution of subsidies through public health services in Indonesia, 
1978-97," in Public spending and the poor: Theory and evidence. van de Walle and Nead 
eds. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 
WHO. 2000. "Health Systems: Improving Performance." 2000 World Health Report. Geneva. 
WHO. 2001. "Macroeconomics and health: Investing in health for economic development. Report 
of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health." World Health Organization: Geneva. 
Wolfe, B. L. and J. R. Behrman. 1984. "Determinants of women’s health status and health-care 
utilization in a developing country." Review of Economics and Statistics, 56, pp. 696-703. 
World Bank. 1987. Financing health services in developing countries : an agenda for reform. 
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.: World Bank. 
World Bank. 1993. World development report, 1993: Investing in health. Oxford; New York; 
Toronto and Melbourne: Oxford University Press for the World Bank. 
 